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Notes made on presentation EU Governance 16 July
The Convention on the Future of Europe is widely expected to
result in a proposal for a written EU constitution.  Discussion of
the pros and cons of this development tend to focus upon two
issues.  On the one hand, proponents and opponents of reform
seek to legitimate the EU as a ‘regime’ or form of governance.
For example, strengthening the powers of the European
Parliament is hoped to improve democratic accountability, while
incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is
suggested as a way of enhancing legal integrity and the rule of
law.  On the other hand, the debate centres on the EU’s status
as a ‘polity’ and the degree to which a Constitution might allow
a clear demarcation of what is the EU’s area of competence
and what remains the domain of domestic governments and
legal systems.  These two issues are inter-related.  Yet, neither
politicians nor many academics explicitly address the
connections between them.  Some focus on ‘regime’
considerations and seek, almost as an afterthought, to tailor them
to their preferred view of the EU ‘polity’.  Others, especially
Eurosceptics, treat the very discussion of the EU as having a
‘regime’ as an undesirable move in the direction of
acknowledging it as a ‘polity’.  In this piece I wish to suggest
that both approaches are misguided.  Regime and polity interact,
with the latter constraining (without determining) the former.  I
shall explore the three dominant models of constitutionalism to
be found within European political discourse.  Whilst the first
two are the most frequently employed by proponents of
constitutional reform, I shall suggest that it is the third that best
represents the actually existing EU constitution.  Moreover, it
has been the key to the successful integration of Europe hitherto
precisely because it has allowed both the ‘regime’ and ‘polity’
dimensions of the EU to develop in tandem.
Three models of constitutionalism
The three models can be briefly (and somewhat schematically)
outlined as follows:
1) The first model can be loosely identified with the French
republican tradition of Rousseau and Sieyes.  It assumes a
sovereign constituent people who are the source of legitimacy
and rights.  In this account, a sovereign parliament can act as
a constituent power, and so is not bound by any constitution.
Judges are simply the voice of the law and there is no room for
any independent authority, such as a central bank or a supreme
court.
2) The second model can be loosely identified with the German
tradition of Kelsen.  This model assumes a sovereign ‘basic
norm’ consisting of fundamental human rights.  This account
claims to replace the rule of men with the rule of law.  In this
model, a Supreme Court is the guardian of the constitution of a
relatively inflexible kind.
3) Finally, the third model can be loosely identified with the English
‘common law’ tradition of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century.  This model identifies different competencies for the
legislature, judiciary and executive.  However, it leaves the
resolution of conflict between these bodies to negotiation
between them.  No one of them is sovereign over the others.
Nor is there any third party that decides who possesses
competence.  For example, at least until Mrs Thatcher’s period
of office and the recent passing of the Human Rights Act, in
England the courts as guardians of the common law could
challenge the legislative power of parliament by choosing not
to apply a law.  In these cases, a stand-off exists between the
judiciary and the legislature that has to be overcome through
negotiation between the two bodies.  Likewise, whereas the
German and Italian Constitutional Courts follow model 2 and
can rule on the constitutionality of the law, the US Supreme
Court operates in a common law environment and simply rules
on the constitutionality of a given case, thereby leaving the
legislature free to interpret the legislative impact of its decision.
‘Polity’ and ‘Regime’
In different ways, models 1 and 2 both treat the EU’s ‘polity’
dimension as settled.  The first assumes a culturally homogenous
demos, similar to that which the French republican tradition of
education has historically endeavoured to create.  France
notoriously lags behind other member states in the recognition
of national minorities, and also adopts more pronouncedly
assimilationist policies towards ethnic minorities, even if it has
often been more open with regard to immigration.  It is perhaps
no accident that Giscard d’Estaing should have expressed
opposition to Turkey’s membership of the EU.  For unless a
coherent ‘people’ exist, who share a common identity, it is
meaningless to talk of them as a single, sovereign entity.  Even
with its current membership, though, the EU consists of a Union
of the peoples of Europe.  As Eurobarometer polls have
consistently shown, a very small percentage of European citizens
identify themselves as Europeans.  Most view themselves as
nationals first and foremost, with their allegiance to the EU being
linked to (and to some degree conditional upon) its perceived
positive benefits to them as citizens of a member state.  In this
situation, strengthening a sovereign legislature that aspires to
act as a pan-European body could be deeply de-legitimising.  It
raises a very real danger of majority tyranny and the suppression
of minorities.
Perhaps for this reason, most recent efforts have been directed
to model 2.  Yet, it suffers from similar problems.  Much is made
of the member states sharing a common liberal democratic set
of values.  However, this heritage is shared by many non-
European countries, such as Canada and the United States, as
well as European countries outside the EU, such as Norway
and Switzerland.  In itself, it cannot resolve the ‘polity’ aspect of© The Federal Trust for Education and Research
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the EU’s constitution.  Does this matter?  Surely a just regime is a
just regime whatever the polity.  The problem is that although at
a very abstract level a consensus may obtain regarding the
desirability of, say, the rights in the European Convention of
Human Rights or those in the new Charter of Fundamental Rights,
considerable dissent exists over how these rights apply to
particular circumstances, should be balanced against each other,
or how and by whom they should be implemented.  As I noted
in presenting the three models, the member states possess
different constitutional and political cultures that lead them to
view the source, subjects and scope of rights differently.  For
example, some traditions give protection to cultural and
especially language rights, others do not.  Some include a
reference to a right to privacy that restricts freedom of speech
more than in other countries.  These sorts of difference have
figured in a number of clashes between the European Court of
Justice and the constitutional courts of the member states.  Thus,
the German and Italian constitutional courts in particular have
wanted to reserve their right to adjudicate on both questions of
conflict between community measures and fundamental rights
of their respective constitutional orders.  They have also reserved
the right, albeit with qualifications, to decide on the question of
the competence between national and community law (for their
latest pronouncements on this issue see Bananas Decision of 7
June 2000 and Fragd respectively).  In these cases, they have
wanted to prevent the EU’s regime going beyond what they
deem to be its polity competence.  It is not that the Member
States do not share the general aspirations of a liberal democratic
regime, but they interpret them slightly differently and most
crucially believe the legitimate polity within which the task of
interpretation should occur is the national level.  It is sometimes
objected that one can have a clear demarcation between the
European and national level.  But this belief is naïve in the
extreme.  European law has been shown time and again to have
knock on effects for huge amounts of domestic legislation – often
rightly so.  What has not been accepted, is the ECJ’s claims to
supremacy.  Indeed, from the perspective of the third model –
which has de facto operated with the EU thus far, such claims
are viewed as illegitimate and at times even a threat to rights.
The key to the third model is a ‘mixed’ regime that not only
separates power by dividing functions but also balances power
between different groups of people and constituencies.  Within
the EU, for example, there is not only a separation of decision-
making powers between the council of ministers, the commission
and the European parliament, these bodies also represent
different perspectives on the EU – namely, intergovernmental,
supranational and an emerging transnational view (although
national perspectives also prevail in the EP).  This division is
similarly present in the legal dialogue between the European
Court of Justice and national constitutional courts.  Despite the
monist view of its supremacy asserted by the ECJ in Simmenthal
and International Handelsgesellschaft cases, EU law is to a large
degree multi-dimensional, with most member state courts locating
EU law within the domestic legal order.  Tacitly, the ECJ has
often had to accept this state of affairs.  As a result, both national
legal orders and the EU legal order have engaged in a process
of mutual understanding and accommodation.  As with EU
decision-making more generally, this process has not led to
agreement only being possible on a lowest common
denominator.  On the contrary, it has legitimated a general
raising of common standards and a deepening of integration.  It
was, for example, challenges by the German and Italian courts
which obliged the ECJ explicitly to incorporate human rights
considerations into its jurisprudence.  Moreover, it did so by
reference to a wide range of documents – from the European
convention and other international charters, to the bills of rights
found in many of the member states.  The result has been a
deep and nuanced jurisprudence that has obliged both the ECJ
and national courts to have a fuller appreciation of the concerns
of different traditions.  Thus, the EU regime and polity have both
reflected and to some degree developed through the interaction
with and between the polities and regimes of the member states.
The ‘mixed’ character of the EU’s polity as national, supranational
and transnational, is echoed in the mixed character of its regime.
Conclusion
The Convention on the Future of Europe, like the convention of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, is often justified on the
grounds that current arrangements are too mixed to either
produce coherent policies or be comprehensible to ordinary
citizens.  Against this charge, one has to put the extraordinarily
dynamic character of the EU, which has shown no let up over
the past few years.  Moreover, this enhanced integration has
gone together with a wide acceptance of the rule of European
law.  There is a danger that the adoption of either model 1 or 2,
or some mix between them, will at best fix the EU at its current
stage of development and at worst delegitimise some of the gains
already made and many that might be achieved in the future.
The reason rests on their being in each case forms of regime
that demand far greater advances in the EU ‘polity’ than is
desired by either the vast majority of citizens or politicians.  In
the particular, the general favouring of model 2 by the latter is
in large part because they believe – I think misguidedly – that
this will be the best way to entrench the prerogatives of the
member states within the EU constitution.  In sum, the convention
is unnecessary and premature, it will entrench many of the worst
aspects of the EU while undermining many of the best – not
least its capacity for the flexible development of an EU polity
and regime that respects the diversity of its constituent parts and
enables each deepening and widening of the Union to advance
with the consent of the peoples of Europe.